

Privacy-preserving Tobit filtering for nonlinear systems: when multi-rate sampling meets censored measurements

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Abstract

- The filtering problem has long been recognized as an active research topic in signal processing.
- The differing physical features among system components usually cause the state updates and the measurement sampling to occur at different rates.
- Due to the intrinsic limitations of sensing devices, the acquired measurement data are frequently subject to censoring effects.
- In view of the openness of communication networks, the measurement signals are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks during transmission.
- The Paillier encryption-decryption mechanism (PEDM) is integrated in our study, upon which a privacy-preserving Tobit filtering algorithm is presented for multi-rate nonlinear systems.
- An upper bound of the filtering error second moment is derived, and then minimized through the design of a proper filter parameter.
- The uniform boundedness of the filtering error in the mean-square sense is investigated.
- The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed Tobit filtering algorithm are demonstrated through a simulation experiment.

Problem formulation

System model:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{t+1} &= f(x_t) + C_t \omega_t, \\ y_{kt}^* &= h(x_{kt}) + v_{kt}. \end{aligned}$$

Measurement censoring:

- Tobit Type I observation model:

$$\check{y}_{s,kt} = \begin{cases} y_{s,kt}^*, & \text{if } y_{s,kt}^* > \mathbf{g}_s, \\ \mathbf{g}_s, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- We denote:

$$\gamma_{kt}^s = \mathbb{1}_{[y_{s,kt}^* > \mathbf{g}_s]} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y_{s,kt}^* > \mathbf{g}_s, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- Approximation of the uncensored probability:

$$\bar{\gamma}_{kt}^s \approx \Phi \left(\frac{\bar{h}_s(\hat{x}_{kt|k(t-1)}) - \mathbf{g}_s}{\sqrt{R_{kt}^{s,s}}} \right).$$

- Augmented form of censored measurements:

$$\check{y}_{kt} = \mathbf{L}_{kt} y_{kt}^* + (I - \mathbf{L}_{kt}) \mathbf{g}_s.$$

Multi-node random access protocol:

- The probability distribution of τ_{kt}^s :

$$\mathbb{P}\{\tau_{kt}^s = 1\} = \frac{\varrho}{m} \triangleq \bar{\vartheta}, \quad \mathbb{P}\{\tau_{kt}^s = 0\} = 1 - \bar{\vartheta}.$$

- Let $\vec{y}_{kt} = \text{col}_{s=1}^m \{\vec{y}_{s,kt}\}$ and $\Omega_{kt} = \text{diag}_{s=1}^m \{\tau_{kt}^s\}$. Then, we have $\vec{y}_{kt} = \Omega_{kt} \check{y}_{kt}$.

PEDM:

Key generation:

- Generate the public key $N = q_1 q_2$.
- Compute the private key $\kappa = \text{lcm}(q_1 - 1, q_2 - 1)$ and $\mu = \kappa^{-1} \bmod N$.

Mapping:

- $\zeta_{s,kt} = \lceil \varpi_s \vec{y}_{s,kt} + \pi(\varpi_s \vec{y}_{s,kt}) \rceil$, where

$$\pi(\varpi_s \vec{y}_{s,kt}) = \begin{cases} \rho_1, & \text{if } \varpi_s \vec{y}_{s,kt} < 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Encryption:

- $\delta_{s,kt} = (N + 1)^{\zeta_{s,kt}} \alpha^N \bmod N^2$.

Decryption:

- $\zeta_{s,kt} = L((\delta_{s,kt})^\kappa \bmod N^2) \mu \bmod N$.

Inverse mapping:

- $\bar{y}_{s,kt} = \frac{\zeta_{s,kt} - \theta(\zeta_{s,kt})}{\varpi_s}$, where

$$\theta(\zeta_{s,kt}) = \begin{cases} \rho_1, & \text{if } \zeta_{s,kt} > \rho_2, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- The mapping error satisfies $|\iota_{s,kt}| \leq \frac{1}{2\varpi_s}$. Next, it is clear that $\bar{y}_{kt} = \vec{y}_{kt} + \iota_{kt}$.

Compensation strategy:

$$\tilde{y}_{s,kt} = \begin{cases} \bar{y}_{s,kt}, & \text{if } \tau_{kt}^s = 1, \\ \hat{\bar{y}}_{s,kt|k(t-1)}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Then, we have $\tilde{y}_{kt} = \Omega_{kt} \bar{y}_{kt} + (I - \Omega_{kt}) \hat{\bar{y}}_{kt|k(t-1)}$.

Model transformation:

$$\xi_t = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } t \text{ is a multiple of } k, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Then, the output signal is rewritten as $y_t = \xi_t \tilde{y}_t$.

Tobit recursive filter:

The Tobit recursive filter is designed as

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{x}_{t+1|t} &= f(\hat{x}_{t|t}), \\ \hat{x}_{t+1|t+1} &= \hat{x}_{t+1|t} + \mathcal{K}_{t+1} \{y_{t+1} - \xi_{t+1} \bar{\vartheta} (2 - \bar{\vartheta}) \\ &\quad \times [\bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1} (\bar{h}(\hat{x}_{t+1|t}) + \mathcal{X}_{t+1} \mathbf{R}_{t+1}) \\ &\quad + (I - \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}) \mathbf{g}]\}. \end{aligned}$$

Main results

- Upper bound of prediction error second moment:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{t+1|t} &= 2(1 + \mathbf{h}_t) (\lambda_{1,t}^2 \text{tr}(\mathcal{P}_{t|t}) + \lambda_{2,t}^2) I \\ &\quad + (1 + \mathbf{h}_t^{-1}) \mathcal{A}_t \mathcal{P}_{t|t} \mathcal{A}_t^T + C_t Q_t C_t^T. \end{aligned}$$

- Upper bound of filtering error second moment:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{t+1|t+1} &= (1 - \xi_{t+1}) \mathcal{P}_{t+1|t} + \xi_{t+1} \left\{ \mathbf{e}_{1,t+1} \mathcal{O}_{t+1} \mathcal{P}_{t+1|t} \mathcal{O}_{t+1}^T \right. \\ &\quad + 2\mathbf{e}_{2,t+1} (\eta_{1,t+1}^2 \text{tr}(\mathcal{P}_{t+1|t}) + \eta_{2,t+1}^2) \bar{\vartheta}^2 \mathcal{K}_{t+1} \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}^T \\ &\quad \times \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}^T \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T + \mathbf{e}_{3,t+1} \mathcal{K}_{t+1} (\mathbf{B}_{t+1} \circ \bar{\mathcal{A}}_{t+1}) \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T \\ &\quad + \mathbf{e}_{4,t+1} \bar{\vartheta}^2 \mathcal{K}_{t+1} [\mathbf{e} \circ (\bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1} \bar{h}(\hat{x}_{t+1|t}) \bar{h}^T(\hat{x}_{t+1|t}) \\ &\quad \times \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}^T)] \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T + \mathbf{e}_{5,t+1} \mathcal{K}_{t+1} (\mathcal{D} \circ \mathcal{G}_{t+1}) \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T \\ &\quad + \mathbf{e}_{6,t+1} \mathcal{K}_{t+1} [\mathcal{F}_{t+1} \circ (\mathcal{X}_{t+1} \mathbf{R}_{t+1} \mathbf{R}_{t+1}^T \mathcal{X}_{t+1}^T)] \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T \\ &\quad + \mathbf{e}_{7,t+1} \mathcal{K}_{t+1} [\mathcal{G}_{t+1} \circ (\mathbf{g} \mathbf{g}^T)] \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T + \mathbf{e}_{8,t+1} \bar{\vartheta}^2 \\ &\quad \times \mathcal{K}_{t+1} \{ \mathbf{e} \circ [(I - \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}) \mathbf{g} \mathbf{g}^T (I - \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1})^T] \} \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T \\ &\quad \left. + \mathbf{e}_{9,t+1} \mathcal{K}_{t+1} (\mathcal{D} \circ \mathcal{H}) \mathcal{K}_{t+1}^T \right\}. \end{aligned}$$


- The filter gain: $\mathcal{K}_{t+1} = \mathbf{e}_{1,t+1} \bar{\vartheta} \mathcal{P}_{t+1|t} \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^T \bar{\mathbf{L}}_{t+1}^T \mathcal{J}_{t+1}^{-1}$.
- We give some parameter constraints and symbol definitions. It is obtained that $\mathbb{E}\{\tilde{x}_{t|t} \tilde{x}_{t|t}^T\} \leq \mathcal{P}_{t|t} \leq \bar{\mathbf{p}} I$. Hence, using the linearity of expectation, one has

$$\mathbb{E}\{\|\tilde{x}_{t|t}\|^2\} \leq \text{tr}(\mathcal{P}_{t|t}) \leq n_x \bar{\mathbf{p}},$$

which indicates that the filtering error is uniformly bounded in the mean-square sense.

Target tracking simulation

$x_t = \text{col}_{i=1}^6 \{x_t^i\}$, where (x_t^1, x_t^3, x_t^5) and (x_t^2, x_t^4, x_t^6) denote 3D position and velocity.



Conclusions

- An innovative Tobit filtering strategy has been developed to mitigate the effects of measurement censoring and eavesdropping attacks under a multi-node random access protocol.
- An upper bound of the filtering error 2nd moment has been derived, enabling the filter computation.
- The uniform boundedness of the filtering error has been examined in the mean-square sense.
- A target tracking example has shown the efficacy of the proposed Tobit filtering scheme.